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Just when you thought it was safe to assume that the law on relocation disputes had been settled 
beyond doubt, along comes F v L (Permission to Relocate: Appeal) [2017] EWHC 1377 (Fam).  
 
The facts  
 
Both parents were Italian nationals; the father had been in the UK since 2001, the mother since 2013. 
The child was, it seems, born in Italy in 2012 but came to this country in 2013 and had a British 
passport. For a while, the father was a stay-at-home carer while the mother was at work although the 
decision for the father not to seek employment in this period was apparently a source of criticism 
from the mother’s family. The parents’ relationship broke down in 2015. The mother left the family 
home with the child and the care of the child was shared in the months leading up to the hearing.  
 
At first instance, the mother was seeking to relocate while the father had cross-applied for a child 
arrangements order (the detail of his application is not set out in the judgment. At the final hearing, 
the court heard from both parents and from the Cafcass officer who recommended in favour of the 
relocation. The mother made various serious allegations against the father of controlling and 
emotionally abusive behaviour but the court did not make any findings about these allegations. HHJ 
Owens refused permission for a mother to relocate to Italy with the child, and made a child 
arrangements order for shared care.  
 
The appeal  
 
The matter came before Russell J on the mother’s appeal. In allowing the appeal and remitting the 
matter for a retrial before a different judge, Russell J identified three errors in the family court’s 
approach:  
 
1. The judge’s approach to the two applications – for relocation and for child arrangements – was 
flawed, in that her judgment addressed the issue of relocation first with only a “belated, deferred 
analysis” of what child arrangements should be made.  
 
2. The judge had failed to make any findings about the serious allegations made by the mother 
regarding the father’s behaviour, in circumstances where, if those allegations were true, they would 
amount to an offence under s 77 of the Serious Crime Act 2015; 
 
3. The judge had given inadequate reasons for departing from the clear recommendation of the 
Cafcass officer.  
 
Let us consider the three grounds in reverse order.  
 
The third ground  
 
The third ground is relatively uncontentious and little is said about this in the appeal judgment which 
makes it is difficult to assess the extent to which HHJ Owens may or may not have addressed it. It is 
worth noting, though, that a judge is not required to say, in terms, “I am disagreeing with the Cafcass 
officer because...” as long as the overall reason for differing in conclusion is apparent from the 
judgment read as a whole (see, eg, Re V (Residence: Review) [1995] 2 FLR 1010 (CA) at 1019).  
 
The second ground  
 
The second is a little more interesting. Russell J’s comments about the coercive controlling 
behaviour are worth noting for their clarity and force:  
 
“[T]he judge was wrong not to have considered and made findings in respect of the 
complaints of abusive and controlling behaviour on the part of [the father] as alleged by 
[the mother].  It was the Cafcass officer’s view that the child was living between, ‘what 
must be [an] incredible strain that both parents are clearly under’. The judge simply split 
the child’s time between two homes in what may seem to be an even-handed approach to 
a difficult and all too common problem. This is an unsophisticated, over-simplistic 
approach, all too often taken by the family court when making child arrangements orders, 
to attempt to adhere to the amendments to the [Children Act] brought in by the Children 
and Families Act 2014 by making an order for shared care which is an even split of time 
and to compel parents to co-operate. Splitting a child between two homes which are 
antagonistic and unsupportive of each other is not consistent with the best interests of a 
child nor congruent with that child’s welfare.” (para 11)  
 
However, it is worth remembering earlier authority which said quite clearly that a high level of 
parental conflict was not in itself a reason to avoid a shared care arrangement. Cases like Re R 
(Children) [2005] EWCA Civ 542 FLR make clear that parental conflict of various kinds of no 
obstacle to shared care, while other cases like A v A (Children) (Shared Residence) [2004] EWHC 
142 (Fam) FLR suggest that the making of a shared residence order (as it was then called) might 
actively help in reducing difficulties. Now, many may be sceptical about whether that approach was 
right but it is easier to answer these concerns if the relevant case law is addressed and analysed. As 
things stand, Russell J’s broad claims about children’s welfare in high conflict shared residence 
situations may strike a different note from some earlier cases. Those cases need to be tackled head on 
if we are to make changes in the approach to these issues.  
 
The first ground 
 
The most interesting point about this case, though, is Russell J’s first ground for allowing the appeal. 
The High Court described it as “a serious procedural irregularity in the proceedings principally 
because the judge failed to approach the case as she should have done by considering and deciding 
the question of the child’s main carer and child arrangements, prior to considering the application to 
relocate” (para 8, original emphasis). (Whether the order in which a judge considers factors in her 
judgment is properly called a ‘procedural irregularity’ is perhaps debatable.) Russell J then 
continued:  
 
“It is well established law that when the future care of a child is in dispute this must be 
resolved before an application for removal from the jurisdiction can be considered. The 
case law on relocation applications, going back over fifteen years and more, commencing 
with the case of Payne v Payne [2001] 1FLR 1052 (see Butler-Sloss P at [80]), makes it 
clear that the welfare of a child is best served by considering issues of care, and who can 
best provide that care is an issue that is to be decided in advance of considering 
relocation.” (Para 8.)  
 
These claims are, with respect, difficult to accept, particularly in the light of more recent Court of 
Appeal authorities, but even looking back it is difficult to locate a case which is actually clear 
authority for Russell J’s proposition that there must be a particular order to making these kinds of 
determinations. Paragraph 80 of Butler-Sloss P’s judgment in Payne is just part of the President’s 
summary of the earlier caselaw; it is more likely that Russell J means para 86, which says this:  
 
“All the above observations have been made on the premise that the question of residence 
is not a live issue. If, however, there is a real dispute as to which parent should be granted 
a residence order, and the decision as to which parent is the more suitable is finely 
balanced, the future plans of each parent for the child are clearly relevant. If one parent 
intends to set up home in another country and remove the child from school, surroundings 
and the other parent and his family, it may in some cases be an important factor to weigh 
in the balance. But in a case where the decision as to residence is clear as the judge in this 
case clearly thought it was, the plans for removal from the jurisdiction would not be 
likely to be significant in the decision over residence. The mother in this case already had 
a residence order and the judge's decision on residence was not an issue before this 
court.”  
 
Now, that might go some way to supporting Russell Jbut the President’s wording is more subtle : the 
President describes the future plans of each parent as being “clearly relevant”, and the fact of a 
proposed relocation,  “may in some cases be an important factor to weigh in the balance”. The 
President certainly says nothing about residence having to be decided before relocation: rather, she 
says that it is part of the overall evaluation.  
 
However, even if Russell J is right about the meaning of that paragraph, Payne is dangerous territory 
these days, when it has been clearly said by the Court of Appeal that the starting point for any 
analysis is K v K (International Relocation: Shared Care Arrangement) [2011] EWCA Civ 793, 
[2012] 2 FLR 880. As Ryder LJ has explained in Re F (International Relocation Cases) [2015] 
EWCA Civ 882, FLR “Selective or partial legal citation from Payne without any wider legal analysis 
is likely to be regarded as an error of law” (para 27) because what is required in a relocation case (as, 
indeed, in any welfare case) is a global, holistic analysis of the child’s best interests (paras 28-30). 
The same point was summarised by Vos LJ in Re C (Internal Relocation) [2015] EWCA Civ 1305, 
FLR para 82, in this way:  
 
“[I]n cases concerning either external or internal relocation the only test that the court 
applies is the paramount principle as to the welfare of the child.  The application of that 
test involves a holistic balancing exercise undertaken with the assistance, by analogy, of 
the welfare checklist, even where it is not statutorily applicable.  The exercise is not a 
linear one.  It involves balancing all the relevant factors, which may vary hugely from 
case to case, weighing one against the other, with the objective of determining which of 
the available options best meets the requirement to afford paramount consideration to the 
welfare of the child.” (Emphasis added.)  
 
With these recent cases firmly in mind, it is difficult to see how the approach in this case fits with the 
overall requirements of a global, holistic analysis. HHJ Owens is criticised on appeal because she 
dealt with the relocation issue first, and only after she had dealt with that did she consider child 
arrangements. Without the benefit of seeing the first instance judgment, it is hard to say but my 
experience of relocation cases is that care arrangements (whether relocation is allowed or refused) are 
an integral part of that issue. It is hard to see how a judge could determine a relocation application 
without having in mind the implied (but usually express) implications for the child’s care 
arrangements. If a relocation is refused, it is very often because the judge takes the view that the 
child’s welfare requires him or her to have more input from the non-moving parent than would be 
possible if relocation were granted. That seems to me to encapsulate consideration of care 
arrangements, albeit a judge may come at the end of her judgment to consider in detail what the 
implications are, precisely, of the decision about relocation in terms of care arrangements.  
More problematic, in fact, may be the approach which Russell J purports specifically to impose on 
the trial judge tasked with rehearing this appeal:  
 
“Remitted to a different circuit judge for re-hearing in the first instance of the 
arrangements for [the child] and, thereafter, of any renewed application by [the mother] to 
relocate to Italy.” (para 15) 
 
That risks being, with respect, an impermissible gloss on the welfare enquiry.  First of all, this was 
the mother’s application to relocate: the father had cross-applied for a child arrangements order. Why 
the mother should have to renew her application is a mystery. But more importantly, Russell J’s 
approach here appears to be explicitly linear: first the judge must consider care arrangements, then 
the judge must consider relocation. I would respectfully say that that is inappropriate: it runs contrary 
to the more recent Court of Appeal authorities, and in any case adds an artificial delineation between 
two issues which are usually inseparably bound together.  
 
A word about Brexit 
 
No article or judgment these days can be said to be complete without some comment on Brexit. 
Russell J’s judgment substantive judgment ended with this point:  
 
“The fact that as EU citizens [the child]s parents’ residence and their status in the UK no 
longer has the certainty it previously had, and the possibility that relocation to Italy may 
become a necessity is a factor that should, properly, have been considered by the trial 
judge.” (para 16) 
 
There is no indication as to whether this issue was addressed in evidence, but it may be difficult to 
take this element into account in the decision. There is clearly no risk to either parent’s ability to 
remain in this country at present, and it is not clear the extent to which hypotheticals should be 
considered in a welfare analysis. If relocation becomes a necessity in the future, then that will be a 
proper basis for an application in the future but, to my mind, its present relevance to any particular 
child’s welfare is limited.  
